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Abstract - This paper proposes to formulate security con-
trol as a sequential decision making problem and presents
new developments in automatic learning of sequential de-
cision making strategies from simulations and/or informa-
tion collected from real-life system measurements. The ex-
ploitation of these methods for the design of decision mak-
ing strategies and control policies in the context of preven-
tive and emergency mode dynamic security assessment and
control is discussed and further opportunities for research in
this area are highlighted.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Power system security control aims at taking (manu-
ally or automatically) decisions and actions in order to pre-
vent the system from entering a mode where widespread
disturbances and service interruptions become unavoid-
able. Typically, security control is carried out in two
complementary frameworks, namely so-called preventive
security assessment and control, and emergency control.
While in preventive mode operator expertise together with
extensive analytical calculations may be combined in or-
der to tackle an optimal tradeoff between safety and econ-
omy, in emergency mode time and information limitations
imply that only simple, fast, well prepared control actions
are taken in semi or fully automatic mode [1]. In both con-
texts the environment within which security control deci-
sions must be taken is full of complexities and generally
subject to a significant amount of uncertainties concern-
ing system state, ongoing processes in remote parts of the
interconnection, and dynamic behavior of all the local pro-
tections and automatic or manual controls interfering with
preventive and emergency control actions. Considering
the quickly increasing risks of blackouts and the wealth
of available but totally underused tools and techniques, it
is clear that today security control in the broad sense is
generally tackled in a highly suboptimal way with respect
to what could and should be achieved.
In particular, since the late sixties (starting with the
work of Tom DyLiacco [2, 3]), automatic learning has re-
peatedly been advocated as an appropriate tool in order
to help coping with complexity, uncertainties and time
constraints in many environments and particularly in the
context of preventive and emergency control for voltage
and transient stability. During the subsequent decades the
progress in computational means (both hardware and soft-
ware) has been tremendous, and automatic learning has
matured as a rich and highly productive research field, to-
day one of the most active areas within computer science,
systems theory, computational mathematics and statistics.
Nevertheless, real-world power systems security related
applications of automatic learning are almost unexisting,
with the notable exception of a few European TSOs (RTE,
NGT, ELIA) in the context of planning and operational
planning [4] and the use at Hydro-Que´bec for pre-setting
of special protection systems [5].
One objective of this paper is to provide a review some
of the new developments in automatic learning based se-
quential decision making, and to explain their relevance in
the context of power system security control applications.
We first recall classical results from (stochastic) dynamic
programming and (stochastic) optimal control theory (sec-
tion 2) and explain why to use this framework for power
system security control (section 3). We then revisit the ba-
sic principles of supervised and reinforcement learning as
two complementary frameworks to design dynamic closed
loop control algorithms and sequential decision policies
(section 4) and explain how to apply them to security con-
trol in various contexts with more or less available infor-
mation and time for decision making (section 5). We end
the paper with a discussion of the real-life applicability
of the proposed framework and tools and some hints for
further research and developments (section 6).
2 SEQUENTIAL DECISION PROBLEM
STATEMENT
We recall well-known results from (stochastic) dy-
namic programming and (stochastic) optimal control the-
ories. Our objective is mainly to set the framework under
which the remainder of the paper is shaped while stress-
ing the similarities of the problems of designing a human
agent’s decision making strategy and an automatic con-
trol device’s control algorithm. A much more detailed de-
scription, including the mathematical assumptions, can be
found in [6], from which we also borrow the notation.
2.1 General stochastic system model
Let us consider a discrete time state description of a
stochastic dynamic system
xk+1 = fk(xk, dk, wk), k = 0, 1, . . . , h− 1 (1)
where
k indexes the discrete time,
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xk is called the system state at time k,
dk is the control or decision variable applied at time k,
wk is a random process (also called disturbance),
h denotes the temporal horizon of the problem.
Furthermore, we denote by Xk the state space at time
k, i.e. the mathematical structure describing a set of pos-
sible states of our system model at time k, by Dk(xk)
the set of allowed control decisions at time k (possibly
a function of the state xk). The random disturbance model
is given in the form of a conditional probability distribu-
tion Pk(·|xk, dk) that may depend explicitly on the current
state and control decision, but not on past values of w.
Supposing that the system is initially (at step k = 0)
in a given state x, its trajectory is then defined by the fol-
lowing random process:
1. set k = 0 and xk = x;
2. the control agent selects a control dk ∈ Dk(xk), and
a random experiment selects a value of wk distributed
according to Pk(·|xk, dk);
3. at time k + 1 the system moves to state xk+1 =
fk(xk, dk, wk) ∈ Xk+1 according to its dynamics,
4. the process repeats itself h− 1 further times, by replac-
ing the index k by k+1 at stage 2, yielding a trajectory
of h stages.
Notice that the notion of state used here is an extension
of the classical notion of state used in deterministic sys-
tems theory. More specifically the information encoded in
the state is such that, once xk and dk are given, the sub-
sequent states are stochastically independent of previous
states and controls, although they are not necessarily per-
fectly predictable. This is also called the Markov property,
because if dk depends only on xk the sequence of states
x0, . . . , xh−1 forms a Markov chain.
The system is said to be time-invariant if the function
fk (and the sets Xk and Dk) and the probability distribu-
tion Pk do not depend explicitly on time, in which case we
can drop the subscript k in our notation.
2.2 Performance criterion and candidate strategies
We consider an additive over time return-criterion.
Namely, we define the return over an h-stages “trajectory”
(x0, d0, w0, . . . , xh−1, dh−1, wh−1, xh) by
Jh(x0, d0, . . . , xh) =
h−1∑
k=0
rk(xk, dk, wk). (2)
Notice that this performance criterion takes into account
at each time step an instantaneous reward rk(xk, dk, wk),
which is potentially stochastic (dependence on the random
variable wk) and in general time-dependent.
Often, the decision making agent does not have full
information about the system state. Rather, it can observe
at each time instant a reduced and often noisy set of mea-
surements yk = gk(xk, wk). Hence, the problem is to
define control signals based on this information in such a
way that the return is maximized. Furthermore, the con-
trol policy has to be causal which means that the control
applied at time k is not allowed to depend on information
which has not yet been gathered at time k. Assuming that
the controller has the possibility to observe the system at
time k and to store this value for future usage, the most
general class of control policies that makes sense (we call
these the admissible policies) is defined by a vector π of
conditional probability distributions
πk(dk|yk, dk−1, . . . , d0, y0), k = 0, 1, . . . , h− 1. (3)
The controller can use such a policy to make a random
draw of the control dk at time k depending in some way
on its current knowledge.
Once such a control strategy has been selected, the dis-
tribution of N -stages trajectories starting from a given ini-
tial state x0 = x is well defined. Thus, the so-called ex-
pected return over h-stages
Jπh (x) = E{
h−1∑
k=0
rk(xk, dk, wk)}, (4)
where the expectation is taken according to the distribu-
tion of trajectories starting from x0 = x and induced by
the system dynamics fk, observation equation gk, noise
distribution Pk, and choice of control policy π.
The solution of the optimal control problem consists
of exploiting the knowledge of the system dynamics, ob-
servation equation, and return function so as to define an
optimal policy π∗, i.e. an admissible policy such that for
any initial state x0 = x and any admissible policy π,
Jπ
∗
h (x) ≥ Jπh (x).
We call this very broad class of controllers the non-
anticipating controllers, to distinguish them from open
loop ones which only use the information about y0 and
closed loop ones which only use information about yk to
select dk. Let us notice that if the system is deterministic
and fully observable (i.e. wk = const and yk = xk), opti-
mality may be reached within the class of (deterministic)
open loop policies. For fully observable stochastic sys-
tems optimality may be reached within the class of closed
loop deterministic policies. Furthermore, if the system
and reward function are time invariant and the optimiza-
tion horizon tends towards infinity, these policies may be
restricted to time-invariant ones.
3 SECURITY CONTROL AS A SEQUENTIAL
DECISION PROBLEM
3.1 Preventive control
For preventive security assessment and control, the
information that is monitored and exploited (i.e. yk in
our notation) is the estimated state vector and topology
computed every few minutes from raw measurements by
a state estimation software. Classical approaches to this
problem, like security constrained OPF (SCOPF) or dy-
namic security assessment and control (DSAC) tools, treat
this problem as a static optimization problem, termed in
the following way:
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Given state estimator outputs, static and dynamic
system models, and a list of contingencies, find a set
of preventive control actions such that the induced
instantaneous cost (due to generation rescheduling,
load-shedding. . . ) is minimal and all current security
constraints are satisfied (pre- and post-contingency
ones).1
While this classical approach treats the tradeoff be-
tween security and induced costs in a static (i.e. instan-
taneous way), the actually incurred costs as well as the
resulting security (or the risk of blackouts) are perceived
by system users only averaged over a certain time horizon.
Thus, it may well be justified to take at some time of the
day a rather expensive control action if this is compensated
later by cost-savings; conversely, it may well be justified
to accept the violation of some (N-1) security constraints
when control means are scarce and expensive, and to force
some more (say N-2) constraints at another time of the
day, if this could lead to an overall reduction of the risk
of blackouts. Notice also that a preventive security control
action taken at some time instant may influence the secu-
rity level of the system and security control costs at later
times of the day.
Hence, security control in preventive mode would ac-
tually be more appropriately modeled as a sequential de-
cision making problem over some time horizon (daily,
weekly, etc.) where the performance criterion is the cost of
using control means combined with the risk of blackouts
(the conditional expectation of costs implied by blackouts
in a given state resulting from a given situation and con-
trol action) integrated over an appropriately chosen time-
horizon. Moreover, this problem is highly stochastic, not
only because of the fact that contingencies may occur with
different probabilities at different times of the day, but also
because the operator while deciding on preventive security
control actions has only partial information about the state
and dynamics of the whole interconnection and about the
state in which the system will be at some later time.
In practice, the preventive security control problem is
indeed seen (intuitively) as a sequential decision making
problem in an uncertain environment. Thus, an expert op-
erator would probably not shed load if he believes that the
situation is improving and he would not reschedule gener-
ation to relieve a minor violation if the implied costs were
too high. But, while it is expected from operators to use
their expertise so as to tackle such tradeoffs related to the
sequential and uncertain nature of the problem, to our best
knowledge no security code acknowledges explicitly secu-
rity as a sequential decision making problem in uncertain
environment.
Consequently, the tools and procedures that are used
in operation for preventive security control may be highly
suboptimal from the point of view of either security or
economy, or both.
3.2 Emergency control
Emergency control aims at correctly reacting to the
occurrence of disturbances by (most often automatically)
triggering control actions such as generation and load
shedding or coordinated switching of topology. At this
stage, the cost of control actions is generally not explicitly
taken into account, since the main objective is to prevent
or mitigate loss of load and generation that would incur
without control; rather the objective is to minimize the
amount of load and generation eventually disconnected.
Many emergency control systems operate in a one-
shot open loop mode and are triggered upon the recogni-
tion of the initiating events. More sophisticated and slower
ones are operating in closed loop mode, and rely on rela-
tively local measurements to decide their control action.
The currently used design approach of these emergency
control systems consists of tuning and validating them
based on deterministic assumptions about system behav-
ior, which leads to control systems which are essentially
unable to adapt their control strategy to highly disturbed
or otherwise unusual system conditions. Thus, these con-
trol systems typically fail to reach their objective as soon
as the actual system behavior (including the behavior of
its protections) departs significantly from the assumptions
made during design.
Emergency control actually tackles an optimal control
problem (of minimizing the amount of unserved energy)
with partial information about the system state and highly
uncertain dynamics. The dynamics are uncertain because
the system usually does not operate in disturbed condi-
tions and hence knowledge about its behavior in these con-
ditions is scarce.2 Furthermore, closed loop emergency
control is limited by the quality and quantity of informa-
tion at its disposal, because time and investment costs limit
the geographical extent, temporal resolution, and accuracy
with which the system can be monitored.
Again, we notice that the design procedures of emer-
gency control systems used in industry generally do not
acknowledge explicitly the sequential and uncertain na-
ture of the control problem they tackle.
3.3 Security control as a single problem
The optimal combination of preventive and emergency
control is also a sequential decision problem in uncer-
tain environment. Here, uncertainty is mainly related to
the next contingency. The sequential nature stems from
the tradeoff of incurring costs in preventive mode with
expected costs related to unserved energy in emergency
mode. This tradeoff has been considered by the academic
power systems community in different ways, under the
name of probabilistic security assessment [7]. But, to our
best knowledge not much of this work has actually been
applied in real-life.
1We simplify here by post-poning (see section 3.3) the discussion of the possibility to allow the violation of some post-contingency constraints if
the tool used in preventive mode is able to determine a feasible corrective (emergency mode) control action for these contingencies. We also note that
although this is the objective tackled by the classical approach to preventive security control, existing tools and practices are far from reaching it fully.
2People have used the term of ’hidden failures’ to refer to situations where the system behaves in an unexpected way which is impossible to anticipate
from its operation in normal conditions.
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4 AUTOMATIC LEARNING OF SEQUENTIAL
DECISION POLICIES
Our objective is to define methods which could pro-
vide approximations of optimal sequential decision poli-
cies from a reasonable amount of data. To simplify our
discussion we suppose that the system state is fully ob-
served (i.e. yk = xk). This ideal condition is seldom
satisfied in practice, but the methods that we describe can
be adapted to cope with partial observability.
4.1 Information provided to the learning agent
We suppose that the sole information available to the
learning agent is in the form of a sample of N system tra-
jectories over h stages:
{(xi0, di0, ri0, xi1, di1, ri1, . . . , xih−1, dih−1, rih−1, xih)}Ni=1.
Each trajectory i provides information about the state xit,
decision dit and instantaneous reward rit obtained at each
time step, as well as the terminal state reached. We next
discuss how such samples can be exploited in order to ex-
tract from them an approximation of an optimal decision
strategy.
4.2 Supervised learning from optimal decisions
Supervised learning is usually defined as follows [8]:
Given a training set of input/output pairs, determine
a function (or model, or algorithm) to compute the
outputs given the inputs which not only is accurate
on the training set, but also generalizes well to un-
seen cases.
If the output variable is discrete, one talks about
classification, if it is numerical one talks about re-
gression.
In the context of supervised learning, it is thus assumed
that there is a teacher which provides the learning agent
with examples of correct decisions (outputs) for a repre-
sentative set of states (inputs). The learning agent has then
to generalize this information to unseen situations. In our
context, this assumption corresponds to the case where the
decisions dit taken in the sample trajectories are all opti-
mal, i.e.
∀i = 1, . . . , N ; ∀t = 0, . . . , h− 1 : dit = d∗(xit, t).
Supervised learning can then be directly applied in order
to derive from the original sample h decision rules approx-
imating the h optimal decision functions d∗(·, t), ∀t =
0, . . . , h − 1. More precisely, to extract dˆ∗(·, t) the su-
pervised learning algorithm receives the sample
{(xit, dit)}Ni=1.
In some problems, it is necessary to cope with situations
where the inputs are not providing complete information
about the outputs. This would be the case, for example,
when the teacher uses complete information about the sys-
tem state to determine its control actions while the learn-
ing agent has only access to partial information in the form
of local measurements. In that case, the supervised learn-
ing algorithm will extract an approximate decision rule
that will target the best guess for d∗ given the inputs.
4.3 Reinforcement learning from arbitrary decisions
Supervised learning alone is unable to learn a good
decision policy from a set of system trajectories strongly
corrupted by erroneous (i.e. suboptimal) decisions. Thus,
it is not sufficient when addressing a sequential decision
problem for which there is no experience yet about the op-
timal way of solving it or when there is no alternative way
to determine what is an optimal decision in a given con-
text. In such situations, reinforcement learning should be
used to extract approximations of optimal decision strate-
gies [9, 10].
In essence, reinforcement learning exploits the sample
of trajectories to extract from it approximations of the re-
ward functions rk and system dynamics fk and combines
these using the dynamic programming principle (see [6])
in order to derive an approximation of the sequence of op-
timal policies d∗(·, t).
In particular, the algorithm developed in [11, 12] uses
a supervised learning method (for regression) to determine
approximations (and generalizations) of the so-called Qt-
functions in an iterative fashion. By definition, the func-
tion Qt(x, d) computes the expected reward over t remain-
ing stages when at time h − t the system is in state x,
decision d is taken and subsequently (over the remaining
h− t− 1 stages) the optimal decision policy is used. Ob-
viously, from Qt(x, d) it is possible to directly extract the
optimal decision strategy at time t by
d∗(x, t) = arg max
d∈Dt(x)
Qt(x, d).
The dynamic programming principle implies the Bellman
equation
Qt(x, d) = E{rh−t +max
d′
Qt−1(xh−t+1, d′)},
where the expectation is taken under the condition that
xh−t = x and dh−t = d.
4.3.1 Fitted Q iteration algorithm
Fitted Q iteration exploits batch-mode supervised
learning to yield a sequence of approximate Qt-functions
from a sample of trajectories in the following way:
• Initialization: Set t = 0 and Qˆ0(x, d) ≡ 0.
• Basic iteration:
– Set t = t+ 1
– Create a learning sample lst = {(init, outit)}Ni=1 of




– Apply a supervised learning algorithm to build
Qˆt(x, u) from the learning sample lst.
• Finalization: if t = h extract the approximate opti-
mal decision strategies dˆ∗(·, t) from the sequence of Qˆt
functions by
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4.3.2 Time-invariant case
If the system and reward function are time invariant,
then the fitted Q iteration algorithm (and in general, any
reinforcement learning algorithm) can take better advan-
tage of the available sample of system trajectories. Indeed,
in this case one can use at each iteration t a sample derived











Time-invariance thus allows to make a more effective
use of the information available in the sample of system
trajectories.
4.3.3 Infinite horizon case
If the system is time-invariant and the reward function
is in the form rk(x, d, w) = γkr(x, d, w) with γ ∈ (0, 1),
an approximation of an optimal time-invariant decision
strategy may be obtained by a slightly modified version
of the fitted Q iteration algorithm, where at each stage the
outputs are defined by
outi = rih−t + γ max
d
Qt−1(xih−t+1, d),
and by approximating the infinite horizon policy by
dˆ∗(x, 0) = argmax
d
QˆH(x, d),
where H is sufficiently large to ensure convergence to the
fixed point of the Bellman equation.
4.3.4 Supervised learning algorithm
In principle, the fitted Q iteration algorithm can be
combined with any supervised learning algorithm. How-
ever, the quality of the resulting reinforcement learning
strongly depends on the characteristics of the used super-
vised learning method. In particular, the class of so-called
kernel-methods have interesting convergence and consis-
tency properties [13]. An interesting sub-class of these
latter uses so-called ensembles of randomized trees [14]
which are able to handle efficiently large scale problems
in a totally autonomous way, and are therefore very well
suited to the reinforcement learning context [12].
5 APPLICATION TO SECURITY CONTROL
The basic assumption in the reinforcement learning
framework is that the database is representative in the
sense that the (xk)-parts are representative of the interest-
ing regions of the state-space, that the (dk)-parts are suf-
ficiently diverse to allow the identification of optimal con-
trol actions from the corresponding instantaneous rewards
and successor states rk and xk+1. If the system is non-
deterministic, then these latter should also be condition-
ally representative of the distribution of successor states
and rewards for a given state-action pair. In practice this
implies that the database size (number of system transi-
tions) needed in this protocol is significantly larger than in
the case of the supervised learning protocol (where, how-
ever, we need to be sure that the (dk)-parts are the optimal
actions for the corresponding state xk).
In the context of power system modeling and control
problems, reinforcement learning can be used to exploit
information obtained from different contexts:
• Learning from a power system simulator: it is often in-
teresting, although not strictly necessary, to couple the
learning agent with the simulator so as to exploit the
result of learning in order to influence the way the sub-
sequent four-tuples are generated. Thus the learning
from simulations can be totally autonomous (see e.g.
[15, 16] for some examples) or it can take advantage
of some “teaching” mechanism which chooses in some
way the most interesting simulation scenarios, so as to
speed up learning as much as possible.
• Learning from an actual controlling agent: it is also
possible to exploit in reinforcement learning the infor-
mation gathered from a real system monitoring. For
example, one could collect information about the con-
trol decisions taken by a human operator or by an exist-
ing automatic control device (together with rewards and
successor states) and then use a reinforcement learning
agent to learn a control policy from this information.
The resulting policy may in principle outperform the
original controlling agent. In this way it is also possi-
ble to collect information from several suboptimal con-
trollers of a system and inject it into the learning agent.
• On-line learning: finally, it is possible even to cou-
ple the reinforcement learning agent directly with a real
system, provided that safeguards are imposed in order
to avoid that the agent (initially far from an optimal
controller) creates catastrophic situations.
Of course, data can also be collected from any combina-
tion of these contexts. Even, in the context of uncertain
system dynamics one can generate simulated data under
different modeling hypotheses and inject them into a batch
mode reinforcement learning agent to infer a robust con-
troller.
We refer the interested reader to some of our recent
publications concerning the applications of reinforcement
learning to power system control [16, 17, 18, 19].
5.1 Adaptive and distributed control
In the context of on-line learning, a reinforcement
learning agent continuously collects four-tuples at each
time step and can infer from the associated rewards and
successor states information about the real system perfor-
mance and adapt its control policy to it. Furthermore, if
there are several control agents using reinforcement learn-
ing connected to a single system, they can learn all in par-
allel and each one of them can adapt its performance pro-
gressively, hopefully leading to some kind of coordinated
distributed control. If possible, it is of course advised to
pre-train such multi-agent systems using an off-line simu-
lator before plugging them on a real system.
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6 DISCUSSION
In this paper we revisited security control in order to
highlight the sequential nature of this problem and stress
the fact that optimal security control decisions need to
be taken in spite of many sources of uncertainty. We
have then explained how the combination of supervised
learning and reinforcement learning protocols can be used
within the framework of stochastic dynamic program-
ming to learn from samples of recorded system trajecto-
ries approximations of optimal sequential decision strate-
gies, within a wide class of possible conditions. Indeed,
depending on the quality of information supervised learn-
ing could be applied directly to the available data only if
decisions shown in the examples are close to optimal. On
the other hand, combined with reinforcement learning it
can be applied also if the data is corrupted by subopti-
mal decisions. We have also stressed the fact that during
the last twenty years machine learning has made signif-
icant progress and become a mature discipline offering
a broad class of principles, methods and algorithms that
could handle many complex and large scale problems that
need to be solved for designing robust and near-optimal
security control algorithms.
Although automatic learning was proposed already in
the late sixties for security control, its penetration in the
industry practice is still very low. The well recognized
excellence of power system engineers in exploiting ad-
vanced methods from applied mathematics, control the-
ory and computer science to solve engineering problems
has indeed been shadowed during the last fifteen years by
the ongoing restructuring processes. While Internet and
Multimedia companies have extensively exploited in their
business large scale computational infrastructures where
thousands of PCs are used to speed up search engines
and computer animation software, the Power Industry to-
day uses comparatively very modest amounts of comput-
ers and obsolete techniques to handle the more and more
difficult tradeoff between security and economy.
Clearly, automatic learning has a very high potential
in power systems security assessment. Indeed, it offers
the required methodology and tools able to exploit data
collected from field measurements and from simulations
based on analytical methods, such as time domain simula-
tion, contingency analysis and optimal power flow.
However, without significant efforts to scale up the
computational infrastructure and practices of our industry,
automatic learning and other analytical tools developed in
the last twenty years will remain on the shelf of Universi-
ties for many more years.
In the meanwhile, the researchers who have developed
these tools are turning to other application fields where the
chances of using their work are higher.
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